Abstract. Exploiting linear type structure, we introduce a new theory of weak bisimilarity for the π-calculus in which we abstract away not only τ -actions but also non-τ actions which do not affect well-typed observers. This gives a congruence far larger than the standard bisimilarity while retaining semantic soundness. The framework is smoothly extendible to other settings involving nondeterminism and state. As an application we develop a behavioural theory of secrecy in the π-calculus which ensures secure information flow for a strictly greater set of processes than the type-based approach in [20, 23] , while still offering compositional verification techniques.
Introduction
Linearity is a fundamental concept in semantics with many applications to both sequential and concurrent computation. This paper studies how a linear type structure, close to those of Linear Logic [12] and game semantics [6, 22, 24] , can be used to give a powerful extension of a basic process equivalence, bisimilarity. We use a linear π-calculus introduced in [35] , though the framework is adaptable to various type structures which combine linearity with other elements such as state and nondeterminism. A central idea is that observables, an underpinning of any behavioural semantics, can be given a radical change by exploiting the linear type structure. The resulting bisimilarity is strictly larger than the standard construction while retaining semantic soundness. As an application we develop a behavioural theory of secrecy which, via semantic means, ensures secrecy for a strictly larger set of processes than the type-based approach in [20, 23] .
Let us briefly explain the key ideas of the new bisimilarity, using a process encoding of a λ-calculus. We first recall that the linear π-calculus in [35] can fully abstractly embed λ ()×+ , the simply typed λ-calculus with unit, products and sums. The encoding [[M : α] ] u for a λ-term M : α in [35] is a typed version of Milner's encoding [26] . We also recall that in λ ()×+ , the following equation is semantically sound: Γ M 1 = M 2 : unit for any Γ M 1,2 : unit. Categorically this comes from the uniqueness of arrows from each object to the final one. Operationally this is justified because the closed terms of this type are always β-equal to its unique constant, which we write . For example we have the following equation:
y : unit⇒ unit (y ) = : unit
If we apply the encoding in [35] to this, we obtain the following two processes: Here x(y) is an input of y via x, x(y) is an (asynchronous) output of a fresh name y via x, and ! indicates replication. where ≈ is the standard weak bisimilarity. However, since the encoding is fully abstract, the contextual equivalence ∼ =π in [35] for the linear π-calculus does equate them. Intuitively, this is because the linear type structure allows us to abstract away the additional non-τ -actions in the following way:
1. The action y(e) is typed as an output to replication: thus it just replicates a process in the environment without affecting it. 2. The action e is typed as a linear input: hence it necessarily receives its dual output, neither receiving nor emitting non-trivial information.
For these reasons, the additional actions in [[(y )]] u never affect the environment in a way well-typed observers could detect, and are automatically executable, so they behave "as if they were τ -actions", allowing them to be neglected. This suggests the following principle of behavioural semantics in linear processes.
Categorise some of the typed actions as "non-affecting", and abstract away non-affecting actions as if they were τ -actions.
The type structure plays a crucial role in this principle. Following [7, 11, 14, 18, 33] , the linear π-calculus in [35] includes branching/selection, which correspond to sums in the λ-calculus and additives in Linear Logic [12] . A branching is an input with I-indexed branches of form x[& i∈I ( y i ).P i ], while a selection is an output of form xin i ( z)Q. These constructs have the following dynamics: x[& i ( y i ).P i ]|xin j ( y j )Q −→ (ν y j )(P j |Q). Now consider another equation in λ ()×+ , which uses sums this time. Let bool def = unit+unit below.
y : bool case y of {in i () : in 1 ( )} i∈{1,2} = in 1 ( ) : bool Both processes are equated by ∼ =π. Intuitively this is because an input at e in the first process surely arrives (due to linearity), and whichever branch is selected it leads to the same selection cin 1 . We can thus augment the previous principle as follows.
We may abstract away linear branching inputs as far as they lead to the same action in all possible branches.
The precise formulation of this idea is given in Section 2.
Application of Linear Bisimilarity. The new bisimilarity can justify the equations mentioned above, as well as many of the general equations over linear π-terms in [35] which are used for definability arguments (Proposition 5.7 in [35] ). As another application, Section 5 discusses a behavioural theory of secure information flow for the π-calculus, which uses a secrecy-sensitive bisimilarity built on the top of linear bisimilarity. The theory ensures secrecy through semantic means for a strictly larger set of processes than the type-based theory in [23] (which is already powerful enough to embed representative secrecy calculi such as [3, 32] ). For example, the theory can justify the safety of the following λ-term by encoding ( and ⊥ are high and low secrecy levels, respectively).
case y of {in i () : in 1 ( )} i∈{1,2} : bool ⊥ which is untypable in standard secrecy typing systems, cf. [3, 32] .
Summary of Contributions. The following summarises our main technical contributions. To our knowledge the present work is the first to introduce a consistent theory of bisimilarity for the π-calculus which abstracts away non-τ -actions. The secrecy analysis in (3) would also be new.
1. The introduction of a novel bisimilarity for the π-calculus that exploits the linear type structure. While sound, the resulting equivalence is strictly greater than the standard weak bisimilarity. 2. The establishment of congruency of linear bisimilarity in typed contexts.
The proof is non-trivial due to the abstraction of non-τ -actions and the use of liveness associated with linearity. 3. An application to secrecy analysis where a secrecy-enhanced version of linear bisimilarity is used for formulating and analysing secure information flow in the π-calculus [20, 23] , ensuring secrecy for a strictly greater set of processes than the type-based approaches in [20, 23] while still allowing compositional verification technique.
We also observe that, while the present work concentrates on the pure linear π-calculus, the framework is systematically extendible to more complex type structures which integrate linearity with nontermination, nondeterminism and state [23] , to which we can use the same proof methods to obtain the corresponding results. Such extensions are briefly discussed at the end of Section 5.
Related Work. Since the introduction of Linear Logic [12] , linearity has been studied in various semantic and syntactic contexts. In the setting of the π-calculus, Kobayashi et al. [25] , Yoshida [34] and Sangiorgi [29] studied linearity and its relationship to process equivalences. The present work introduces, for the first time, a consistent theory of bisimilarity based on a labelled transition relation which allows to abstract away non-τ -actions using linear types. In theories of secure information flow, equality over programs often play a central role, cf. [2, 3, 10, 13, 30] . Among them, Focardi et al. [9, 10] present a bisimulation for cryptographic protocols where high-level actions are abstracted away. In contrast with the present work, [9, 10] are based on CCS without using type structure. Abadi and his colleagues studied several typing systems and their equivalences for the Spi-calculus and Join calculi in a series of work, e.g. [1, 2, 4] . In particular in [1] Abadi establishes a secrecy theorem based on a may-equivalence by using type information for controlling the interface of the attacker. Abadi, Fournet and Gonthier [5] also study a process calculus with constructs for authentication and show a full abstraction translation of this calculus into a Join-calculus. The main difference with [1, 2, 5 ] is that we take more abstract approach using linearity of communication in order to limit the environments of opponent processes without specific security constructors such as signatures and nonces, and then apply it for information flow analysis by adding simple security levels to channels. Hennessy and Riely [13] use a secrecy-sensitive may-equivalence for noninterference in the π-calculus. The present work introduces a theory of bisimilarity based on linearity which is directly applicable to secrecy of divergent programming languages. This line of study is not developed in [1, 2, 4, 5, 13] . We also believe our linear bisimilarity technique can be adapted to advanced security constructs such as cryptography [1, 4] , authentication [5] and access controls [13] where linearity is often vital. This would allow to verify more protocols compositionally. Finally the first two present authors proposed, in [20] (with Vasconcelos) and in [23] , type systems for the π-calculus which ensure secrecy. The present paper gives a semantic theory of secrecy, non-trivially extending the syntactic theories in [20, 23] .
Outline of the paper. Section 2 briefly reviews the linear π-calculus in [35] . Section 3 introduces linear bisimilarity, whose congruency proof is given in Section 4. Section 5 discusses an application of the linear bisimilarity to secure information flow analysis. For details of the syntax and types used in the paper, the reader may refer to [7, 35] .
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Preliminaries

Processes and Channel Types
The set of processes is given by the following grammar [7, 35] . Below and henceforth x, y, . . . range over a countable set of names.
x( y).P (resp. x( y)P ) is a unary input (resp. unary output), while x[& i∈I ( y i ).P i ] (resp. xin i ( y)P ) is a branching (resp. selection). P |Q is a parallel composition, (ν x)P is a restriction, and !P is a replication. In !P we assume P is either a unary or branching input. The definitions of structural equality ≡, given in Appendix A is standard except for how we ensure output asynchrony. The reduction relation −→ is generated from the following rules, closed under output prefix, restriction and parallel composition (modulo ≡).
Action modes, ranged over by p, . . ., are members of the sets {↓, !} (written p I , . . .), and {↑, ?} (written p O , . . .). The dual p of p is given by ↓ =↑, ! = ? and p = p. Then the set of channel types is given by the following grammar. For simplicity we assume indices i range over a fixed set {1, 2}.
Above τ denotes a vector of channel types. We define τ , the dual of τ , by dualising the action modes and exchanging ⊕ and & of τ . md(τ ) is * if τ = * , else the outermost action mode of τ . On types is the least commutative partial operation such that (1) τ τ = * (md(τ ) =↓), (2) τ τ = τ (md(τ ) = !) and (3) τ τ = τ (md(τ ) = ?). A branching type is sometimes written [τ 1 &τ 2 ] p and similarly for selection. If τ τ is defined we say they compose. Following [7, 22, 35] , we assume the following sequentiality constraint, which (together with IO-alternation and other elements in the linear type structure) comes from game semantics. We state the constraint only for unary types: for branching/selection types, we require the same constraint for each summand.
•
• In ( τ ) ! md(τ i ) ∈ ? for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n except at most one j for which md(τ j ) =↑. Dually for ( τ )
? .
Typing and Typed Processes
An action type is a finite acyclic directed graph whose nodes have the form x : τ such that no names occur twice and each edge is of form x : τ → x : τ with either md(τ ) =↓ and md(τ ) =↑, or md(τ ) = ! and md(τ ) = ?. We write A(x) for the channel type assigned to x occurring in A. The partial operator A B is defined iff channel types in common names compose and the adjoined graph do not have a cycle. If so, the result is a graph in which intermediate edges are taken away from the adjoined graph (see Appendix B for detailed formal definitions). To avoid divergence, this operator ensures that processes never exhibit circular dependency in actions. For example, x : τ 1 → y : τ 2 and y : τ 2 → x : τ 1 are not composable. fn(A) and md(A) denote the sets of free names and modes in A, respectively. A B indicates A B is defined. Sequents of the linear typing have the form P A. 1 The rules are given in Appendix C. The system is identical with [35] except that we assume a linear 1 In [35] we used a different main sequent, Γ P A. This is equivalent to the present one by adjoining Γ to the right-hand side.
input does not suppress more than one linear output. The following properties of typed terms are from [35] . (3) is a consequence of strong normalisability of linear processes and will play an important role later. Proposition 1.
(liveness) Let P A⊗x : τ with md(τ ) =↑ and md(A) ⊆ {!, * } (⊗ is the graph union). Then P −→ * P such that P ≡ x( y)R or P ≡ xin j ( y)R.
Contextual Congruence and Bisimilarity
A relation R over typed processes is typed when P
implies A 1 = A 2 . We write P 1 R A P 2 when P A 1 and P A 2 are related by a typed relation R. A typed congruence is a typed relation which is an equivalence closed under all typed contexts. The contextual congruence ∼ =π is the maximum typed congruence satisfying the following condition (B appeared in Example 1).
where P ⇓ i x means P −→ * xin i ( y)P . The relation is maximally consistent in the sense that any addition of equations leads to inconsistency.
The congruence ∼ =π may be considered as giving the maximal meaningful way to equate processes. A more restricted and more tractable equality is obtained using labelled transition. Let l, l , . . . be given by:
bn(l) denotes bound names in l. If l = τ , we write sbj(l) for the initial free name of l. Using these labels, the typed transition P A l −→ Q B is defined as in Appendix D. The weak bisimilarity induced by the transition is denoted ≈.
As indicated in the introduction, ∼ =π is strictly greater than ≈. One of the aims of the present work is to fill the gap between ≈ and ∼ =π, at least partially, without loosing the ease of reasoning of ≈.
Linear Bisimilarity
Categorising Actions
We begin our path towards the definition of linear bisimilarity with classifying types according to the following criteria: whether typable actions affect the environment non-trivially; and whether these actions are guaranteed to take place. Definition 1. (affecting and enabled types) 1. τ is affecting iff there exist P 1,2 x : τ and a typed context
Example 2. (affecting and enabled types)
It is notable that no τ such that md(τ ) ∈ {?, ↓} is affecting. 2. Any τ such that md(τ ) ∈ {↓, ↑, !} is enabling, while any τ such that md(τ ) = ? is not. Hence all and only types that are enabled are those with outermost modes ↓, ↑, ?.
As suggested in the above example, we have an easy rule to determine whether a type is affecting or not, based on the shape of types.
Proposition 2. Define Aff as the smallest set of types satisfying the following conditions.
! ∈ Aff when τ ij ∈ Aff for some i and j (i ∈ {1, 2}, 1 ≤ j ≤ n i ).
Then τ is affecting iff τ ∈ Aff.
Note that τ such that md(τ ) ∈ {?, ↑} is never in Aff by definition. Below and henceforth we say P is prime with subject x if either (1) P is input-prefixed with subject x or (2) P has form x(y 1 ..y n )Π i R i or xin i (y 1 ..y n )Π i R i where each R i is prime with subject x.
Proof. (τ ∈ Aff implies τ affecting) By induction on the generation rules above. We use the following fact: to differentiate P 1,2 x : τ , we can always choose a context (ν x)(R|[ ]) where R is a prime term with subject x, typed as τ , such that (ν x)(R|P 1 ) is distinguishable from (ν x)(R|P 2 ). This is a consequence of the Context Lemma and, in addition, operational reasoning based on the type structure, as noted in [35] for linear processes. A detailed proof for affine types is given in [7] . The case of [⊕ i=1,2 τ i ] ↑ ∈ Aff is obvious. Of the remaining cases we only present one as the others are similar. Take, for simplicity, (τ ) ! with τ affecting. Take the context (ν x)(R|[ ]) which differentiates between P 1,2 x : τ .
Now let
! is affecting.
(τ affecting implies τ ∈ Aff) We establish the contrapositive by noting that the complement of Aff is generated in a similar way. 
affecting no no yes no yes yes no enabled yes yes yes yes yes no yes We can now introduce invisibility under linear type structure which dictates the "τ -like" nature of certain non-τ -actions in the typed setting. Below and henceforth ∆, Γ, . . . range over finite sets of names. fn(l) is the set of free names in l while bn(l) is the set of free names in l.
Definition 3.
(invisible actions) A typed action l
A is an output which is non-affecting. 4 If l A is ∆-invisible and, moreover, is enabled, then l A is ∆-strongly invisible (∆-s.i.).
(abstracted transitions) P
we say the latter underlies the former.
Note that the standard abstracted transitions are a special case of those defined
for some ∆-strong invisible l 1 ..l n and l 1 ..l m ; if we restrict all of l 1..n and l 1..m to τ -actions, and usel −→ instead ofl −→ ∆ , then we obtain the standard notion of abstracted transition. Note also there may be more than one sequences of non-τ -actions which underly a given abstracted transition.
Semi-typed Relation and Branching Closure
The invisibility of non-τ -actions necessitates one fundamental change in the notion of bisimulation. As an illustration we go back to the initial example in the introduction. The two typed processes concerned were !x(c).c
A and !x(c).y(e)e.c
. After the common initial action, the typing becomes A ⊗ c : () ↑ . But if y(e)e.c A has an output action (which should and can be abstracted away), then e becomes free in the residual and appears in its type environment. This state should be related to the other process which still has type A ⊗ c : () ↑ . Consequently, a bisimulation needs to relate processes with distinct action types.
Definition 4. A relation R on typed processes is semi-typed when P
A RQ B implies that the projections of A and B on fn(A) ∩ fn(B) coincide. We write
R is semi-typed and fn(A) ∩ fn(B) = ∆, in which case we say P A and Q B are related by R at ∆. The maximum typed subrelation of a semi-typed R is called its centre.
Using semi-typed relation, a natural way to define a bisimulation would be as follows: a semi-typed R such that, whenever P
, we have the following and its symmetric case:
However the following example shows that congruency is lost if we allow branching. zin i ] cannot be equated because, at the disparate interfaces (here x and y), we should expect anything can happen: thus it is possible, at x, the first process receives the left selection, while, at y, the second process receives the right selection (which is precisely what happens in the composition). This indicates that we should say "for all possible branching at disparate channels, the behaviours of two processes at common channels coincide." This idea is formalised in the following definition. Below t, t i , . . . range over sequences of typed transitions. A branching variant of, say, xin 1 ( y) is xin 2 ( z) (conforming to the given typing), taken up to α-equality.
Definition 5. (branching closure) A set {P
A ti −→ Q Bi i } i∈I of sequences of typed transitions is ∆-branching closed (∆-b.c.) iff: whenever t i = sls ∈ S with l being a linear branching input such that fn(l) ∩ fn(∆) = ∅, there is t j = sl s (j ∈ I) for each branching variant l of l.
Accordingly we say {P
Similarly for other forms of abstracted transitions.
Linear Bisimulation
We can now introduce a new bisimilarity on linear processes, which we call linear bisimilarity.
with ∆ = fn(A 1 ) ∩ fn(A 2 ) implies the following and its symmetric case: whenever P
for all i ∈ I. The maximum linear bisimulation exists, denoted ≈ L .
Simple examples of (non-)bisimilarity follow. Below and henceforth we omit obvious type annotations, assuming all processes are well-typed. We often annotate ≈ L as ≈ x,y L (which follows Definition 4) to make intersecting channels explicit.
Intuitively this is because an output at x will surely arrive in which case the former process has the same observable as the latter. 3. Because of the lack of branching closure, we have
On the other hand, we have
We prove the following result in the next section.
Since an action of B-type is always visible, we immediately obtain:
We give simple applications of the linear bisimilarity. Below (1) says processes which are entirely typed with ?-types are equated with the inaction (pA means md(A) = {p}). (2) says there is essentially a unique inhabitant in the unit type of λ-calculi. (3) uses (2) to derive the equality over unit-type λ ()×+ -terms.
where ∼ = is the standard contextual equivalence in λ ()×+ .
Proof. For (1), let R be a semi-typed relation given by:
If l = τ and sbj(l) ∈ Γ then the type of l A is ?-mode, so l A is Γ-invisible. If not, obviously l A is Γ-invisible. So in both cases 0 simulates this by the inaction. Since Γ-part of B is identical with that of A, we are done. For (2), by P ≡!x(c).P |R with R ?A 0 , (1) and Theorem 1, we can safely ignore R. So assume P ≡!x(c).P . Again by Theorem 1 it is enough to show P ≈ c L c. Since all actions on both sides are invisible we are done. (3) is immediate from (2) and Theorem 1 together with Theorem 5.9 (full abstraction) in [35] .
Other applications include a simple proof of the equations for sequentialisation used in [35] , as well as a behavioural theory of secrecy which we develop in Section 5.
Properties of Linear Bisimilarity
Preparation
The purpose of this section is to establish congruency of (the centre of) ≈ L . We shall use the following basic properties of typed transitions. The proofs are straightforward and are omitted. Below in (1, 2), the index of an action is the least subterm(s) that the action originates from (cf. [7, Appendix F] ). 
Bisimulation over Unary Processes
We first summarise a property of linear bisimulation over unary processes, i.e. processes without branching or selection. We denote this subset of linear processes by P () and use ≈ L() for the linear bisimilarity over P () . In the following,
Proof. We show the set of such pairs is a bisimulation. First we note that
and P A2 2 as above and let ∆ = fn(A 1 ) ∩ fn(A 2 ).
If l is invisible this is emulated by inaction. If l is visible, then (by P 1 being unary) l is an replicated input at ∆, with B 1 = A 1 ⊗C for some C. By A 1 A 2 and Proposition 4 (3), we know P
Using this lemma, it is easy to prove the compatibility of ≈ L() under all typed operators since -related processes always result in -related processes by each typed operation (for example, if P i A i and Q i B i with A i B i , A 1 A 1 and B 1 B 1 , then we have
). Hence we have:
This corollary says that any two unary processes of the same type are semantically equal. This is reminiscent of the following property of a simply typed λ-calculus: any two terms of a type generated from the unit type by applying the function space and the product zero or more times, are semantically equal (which in turn corresponds to the fact that all objects generated from a final object by product and exponentiation are again final).
Congruency of ≈ L (1)
As seen in Example 4, Proposition 5 is not valid in the full calculus (e.g. xin 1 ≈ L xin 2 ). The proof for a closure of the full calculus is non-trivial due to the strong invisibility and branching-closure. First, we state the following lemma related to the branching-closedness. Lemma 1.
Then there is a transition sequence P l k+1,1 ...l k+1,n −→ P k+1 such that l k+1,m is a branching variant of l j,m for some 1 ≤ m ≤ n and j ∈ K.
But this contradicts the assumption that {P =⇒ Γ P k l −→ P k =⇒ Γ P kj } is branching closed. We can similarly prove branching-closure of {P k =⇒ Γ P kj } for each k. Now we show that ≈ L is transitive on its centre.
Proof. The proof uses Proposition 4 (4) and Lemma 1 (1) . We show the generated relation to be a bisimulation.
. By assumption and by Lemma 1 (1):
where each of l i and l j is strongly ∆-invisible. Again by assumption:
Note that this is again ∆-b.c. by Lemma 1 (1). We now observe that, by Propo- 
as required.
Remark 2. Proposition 6 does not hold in general if the side condition on free names in the statement (which comes from the renaming theory over processes in [16] ) is taken off. In the light of theory in [16] , we may as well require semi-typed relations to be renaming closed, in which case this side condition is not restrictive when, for example, we compose two semi-typed relations. The theories [15, 16] also gives a basic framework for treating composability of two typed processes related by (semi-typed) linear bisimilarity, which is implicit in the following technical development.
Since ≈ L is immediately reflexive and symmetric, it is an equivalence relation. We can also show ≡⊂≈ L by checking each equation. For example (ν x)(P | Q) ≈ L (ν x)P | Q with x ∈ fn(Q), follows from Proposition 4 (4,5). For compatibility, closure under prefixes is easy. For restriction, by Lemma 1 (3), we can immediately show:
Congruency of ≈ L (2): Parallel Composition
Suppose we wish to prove the relation R
However, due to strong invisibility, the same reasoning does not work for ≈ L even in the above trivial case. Recall the example in the Introduction, P 1 def = !u(x).xin 1 and P 2 def = !u(x).y(e)e.xin 1 . Then we know P 1 ≈ L P 2 because y(e) and e are both invisible, so we have P 1
=⇒ uy P 2 def = xin 1 | P 2 with P 1 and P 2 bisimilar. Suppose we compose them with Q def = !y(e).Q 0 for some Q 0 such that P 1 | Q and P 2 | Q are typable. Then we
In order to achieve P 2 def = xin 1 | P 2 from this process, e.xin 1 needs an acknowledgement e from Q 0 . Now we use a liveness property which extends Proposition 1 (3): if Q 0 has a linear output type at e, then there always exist a finite sequence of strong invisible transitions to emit e such that Q 0 e =⇒ uy Q 0 and Q ≈ L Q 0 | Q. In the following we define such a chain, called call-sequence. Let us assume P l1·l2 =⇒ Q. We write: l 1 b l 2 (l 1 binds l 2 ) when the subject of l 1 is bound by l 2 (e.g. x(y) b y) and l 1 p l 2 (l 1 prefixes l 2 ) when the action l 1 is input-prefixed by l 2 (e.g. x(y) p z in x(y).z). Define = b ∪ p . We write τ l 1 if P l2 =⇒ Q and P has subterms Q 1 and Q 2 such that Q 1 l =⇒ Q 1 and Q 2 l·l2 =⇒ Q 2 with l l 2 ; similarly we define l 1 τ ; we extend this to a chain l 1 τ * l 2 and denote it l 1 + l 2 ([7, Appendix F] gives a detailed definition using occurrences of terms). Then a call-sequence (c.s.) to l under A has the following shape.
Lemma 2. (call-sequence) Let P be typable below. Proof. From the following, we sometimes write τ as (l, l) explicitly if τ is done by interaction between (the indices of) l and l.
(1) is obvious.
(2) By (1), we know there is a shortest transition sequence P
, ↑}. Then exactly one of the following must be true: (a) md(l n ) =↓ with sbj(l n ) ∈ Γ, or (b) l n = τ , since if md(l n ) = !, then l n is not Γ-s.i. and l n should be input or τ . Suppose case (a) holds. Then we have either (1) l n = l 1 or (2) l n−1 b l n with md(l n−1 ) = ? since by the sequentiality constraint, linear outputs cannot directly carry linear inputs. We then set n = n − 1, and apply the same routine. Now suppose case (b) holds. Then we have τ def = (l n , l n ) with md(l n ) ∈ {?, ↑}.
l n , then we just repeat the same routine by setting n = n − 1. Suppose l n−1 l n . By input typing rules,
Hence we can use the same routine by setting n = n − 1. We repeat this procedure until we arrive at n = 1. 
By (1), there is the shortest transitions
By the same reasoning as above, l 1 l 2 · · · l n−1 l n is a call sequence, so all subjects of l i with md(l i ) =↓ are bound by l i−1 except i = 1. Hence if md(l 1 ) = ?, we are done. So suppose md(l 1 ) =↓. If sbj(l 1 ) = x ∈ fn(P ), then by definition of , P should have a type x : τ → e : τ . This obviously contradicts the assumption P is typed by A ⊗ e : τ . (4) By (2) and (3).
Note (3) does not restrict the shape of A, cf. Proposition 1 (3). Together with (2), we know there is always a shortest strongly invisible call sequence to each linear output.
We also use the following lemma. Below (1) with ∆ = fn(A 1 )∩fn(A 2 ) implies the following and its symmetric case: whenever P
2i for all i ∈ I. Then R is a bisimulation. 2. (innocuousness of ?) Suppose P |R i A⊗B i where P A and 
Proof. See Appendix F.1.
In the following lemma, (5) says that if a process moves via a subject which is not in ∆, it does not change its meaning at ∆; (7) says that a ∆-closed call sequences in which every branch gives the same answer (i.e. linear output) can be regarded as a single thread of the standard weak transition, i.e. =⇒.
Lemma 4.
Assume {P =⇒ ∆ P j } is ∆-branching closed call sequences, and for all j, we have
Using Lemma 4 (2), we can reduce the task of checking a bisimulation closure in linear processes.
Lemma 5. Suppose R is a semi-typed relation such that when P A1 1 R P A2 2 with ∆ = fn(A 1 ) ∩ fn(A 2 ) implies the following and its symmetric case: whenever
for all i ∈ I. Call such a relation a restricted bisimulation. Then the maximum restricted bisimulation coincides with ≈ L .
Proof. Let
• ≈ L be the maximum restricted bisimulation. First, obviously
For the reverse inclusion we show that ≈ L is a restricted bisimulation. Let us assume P 1 ≈ L P 2 and P
for all i ∈ I. First, we can write P A2 2
by definition. Then by the Split Lemma (Lemma 1 (2)), {Q
By the following result, we can further reduce the conditions needed for a bisimulation closure. The reduction comes from Proposition 4 (3)) (input availability) and Lemma 4 (5). The form of the resulting relation, as stated in the following proposition, is similar to the branching bisimulation studied in (untyped) confluence processes [28] .
Lemma 6. Suppose R is a semi-typed relation such that when P A1 1 R P A2 2 with ∆ = fn(A 1 ) ∩ fn(A 2 ) implies the following and its symmetric case:
with l input such that sbj(l) ∈ ∆, then there is
1 with l ∆-visible linear output such that sbj(l) ∈ ∆, then there is a ∆-closed call sequences to l {P
with md(l A1 ) = ? and sbj(l) ∈ ∆, there is a ∆-closed call sequence to l, {P
Then the maximum such relation, denoted by
Proof. By Lemma 5, we shall show
Case 1: Suppose P 1 l −→ Q 1 where l is τ or l is ∆-invisible and sbj(l) ∈ ∆. By Lemma 4 (1,5), we always have P 2
Case 2: Suppose P 1 l −→ Q 1 with sbj(l) ∈ ∆ and l input, and there is a ∆-b.c.
. Then by (permutation) and (input availability), we always have P
as in the proof of Lemma 5.
Case 3: Suppose P 1 l −→ P 2 with sbj(l) ∈ ∆ and l linear output, and there is a ∆-b.c. {P
. Then by (permutation) and Lemma 2 (2, shortest c.s.), we always have a ∆-closed call-sequence {P
2i . Then we use Proposition 4 (2) as in the above cases in order to obtain Q 1
Case 4: Suppose P 1 l −→ P 2 with l a replicated output. This case is the same as Case 3 above by using (permutation), Lemma 2 (2) and Proposition 4 (2).
This exhaust all cases, hence we know
Moreover the linear output outside of ∆ is not suppressed by a linear input at ∆.
Proof. See Appendix F.3.
We are ready to prove the closure under parallel composition.
Proof. We use the characterisation of ≈ L in Lemma 6. Let R be generated by:
that any linear output outside of ∆ is not suppressed by a linear input at ∆. We show R is a bisimulation. First suppose (ν w 1 )(
Case 1: Suppose sbj(l) ∈ ∆ and l is an input. Then by assumption, we have
Case 2: Suppose sbj(l) ∈ ∆ and l is invisible. Then by assumption, we have
Case 3: Suppose sbj(l) ∈ ∆ and l is a ∆-visible linear output. Then by assumption, there exits a ∆-branching closed call sequence
Then by Lemma 7, we have a ∆-branching closed call sequences {(ν w 2 )(
, and P 2k l −→ P 3k . By Lemma 4 (2), P 3k ≈ L P 3i . Hence noting fn(P 3k ) ∩ fn(P 3i ) ∩ fn(P 1 ) = fn(P 3k ) ∩ fn(P 1 ), we use transitivity to obtain P 3k ≈ L P 1 . Hence (ν w 2 )(P 3k | Q 2k ) R (ν w 1 )(P 1 | Q 1 ), as required. Case 4: Suppose l is a replicated output. This case is similar to the above using Lemma 7 again. For the condition of suppression, we check that it is maintained during any transition P l −→ P in general. This is straightforward by the typing rules. For example, suppose P A⊗x:τ l −→ P A⊗y:τ →x:τ with md(τ ) =↓. By y ∈ bn(l), l is a replicated output, and obviously y ∈ fn(P ). Hence if x ∈ ∆ is not suppressed by the input at ∆ from the beginning as in the assumption of R, it is maintained during any transitions. Hence we are done. Case 5: If l = τ then P 1 ≈ L P 1 by Lemma 3 (5) . Hence by transitivity the inaction can simulate this as in Case 2. Second, if only Q 1 has an action, this is the same as P 1 . Finally the case when
is the standard reasoning except that we apply the same technique as above for processing additional invisible actions. Assume, without loss of generality, that l is output. If l is at ∆ and this action is not invisible, then (since its dual input is always possible) we can reason precisely as above. If l is done at ∆ but it is invisible, then it is possible that a subset of the simulating b.c. set abstract away l. In this case, however, the dual action is negligible by Lemma 3 (5) and (6), which gives us the required closure. If l is not at ∆ then the closure is immediate using Lemma 6. This exhausts all cases.
Thus we conclude the centre of ≈ L is a congruence. Since the observability predicate given in § 2.3 is easily satisfied by ≈ L , we also know ≈ L ⊆ ∼ =π.
Remark 3. The basic framework of the above proof for closure under parallel composition extends to the settings where we combine such elements as state, nontermination and nondeterminism with linearity (though certain simplification in the proof above is possible due to the pure linear structure, in particular the use of reduced conditions for bisimulation, given in Lemmas 6 and 5). The essential properties we need for this is those of call-sequences, as given in Lemma 2.
As examples of such combination, the reader may refer to [23] . See also Remark 4 at the end of Section 5.
Applications to Secrecy
In linear bisimilarity, we abstract away non-affecting typed actions as if they were τ -actions. If we assign a secrecy level to each channel and stipulate a level of observation, then we can further abstract away those actions which should not be visible from the stipulated level. For example, from a low-level viewpoint, actions at high-level channels should be invisible. The technical development of this secrecy enhancement closely follows that of the linear bisimilarity, and offers a powerful tool for reasoning about secrecy in processes.
Assume given a complete lattice of secrecy levels (s, s , . . .) with the ordering . (the most secret) and ⊥ (the most public) denote the top and bottom of the lattice, respectively. Channel types are annotated with these levels:
The same constraints as before apply to channel types. In τ , we require each dualised occurrence to own identical secrecy levels. Action types are given precisely as before, using secrecy annotated types. P A (or P A ) is derived by the same rules as in Appendix B (the secrecy annotations on types do not affect the derivation of typing judgements). We set:
l
A is s-affecting if it is affecting in the preceding sense and, if l is a linear selection, then sec(A(x)) s (sec(τ ) is the outermost secrecy level of τ In (1) we only count linear selections because in the linear type structure no other types directly emit information. We can now introduce the bisimulation.
Definition 7. (s-bisimulation) A semi-typed relation R is a s-bisimulation when
The maximum s-bisimulation exists for each s, which we write ≈ s .
A simple example of s-bisimilarity:
A basic observation on ≈ s is that it alone does not form a coherent notion of process equivalence. x:τ2→u:τ3 where τ 2 = τ 1 and
The example in the proof above suggests that, for regaining compositionality in ≈ s , we need to restrict the set of processes to those which do not transfer information at some high-level to lower levels. In other words, we require information flow in processes to be secure. Below we say l A is receiving at s if l A is a linear branching and moreover sec(A(sbj(l))) = s. Definition 8. (behavioural secrecy) A set of typed processes S is a secrecy witness if the following holds: whenever P A ∈ S and P A l −→ Q B , we have (1) Q B ∈ S and (2) if l A is receiving at s then P A ≈ s Q B for each s such that s s . P A is behaviourally secure iff P A is in some secrecy witness.
Only linear branching counts as "receiving", which is an exact dual of ≈ s (where we consider abstraction by secrecy levels only for linear selection). Intuitively, a process is behaviourally secure iff, whenever it receives non-trivial information at some level, it behaves, to a lower-level observer, as if the action had not taken place. Some examples of (non-)secure processes follow.
Example 6. 0 ∅ is secure. If P A is secure and (ν x)P A/x is well-typed, the latter is secure. If P y: τ ⊗?A is secure and !x( y).P
→A is well-typed, the latter is secure. Finally, given
A is not secure but
The following is proved precisely as Theorem 1 except that the use of s-invisibility is compensated by behavioural secrecy.
Proposition 9. The centre of ≈ s over behaviourally secure processes is compatible with all operators except linear branching.
Proof. The essence of the proof is the same as that of Proposition 8, using the corresponding properties. The only difference is in the following points: assume, as in the proof of Proposition 8, that (ν w 1 )(P 2 |Q 2 ) simulates an action by (ν w 1 )(P 1 |Q 1 ).
1. When only P 1 has an action, we simply replace all statements "∆-invisible" and "∆-visible" with "s-∆-invisible" and "s-∆-visible", respectively. Using the corresponding lemmas, the same reasoning gives the required results. 2. When P 1 and Q 1 interact, it is possible that, say, P 1 has a linear selection which can be neglected at level s. Then P 2 may not simulate this action, but it is compensated by Q 1 not changing its semantics by the receiving action up to ≈ L : thus P 2 |Q 2 can simulate this action by the inaction, resulting in the same closure.
The second case crucially uses behavioural secrecy for composability.
Combined with a secure version of the linear branching rule, 5 Proposition 9 offers a framework for fully compositional reasoning about secrecy in linear processes. Via embeddings, it can be used for analysing secrecy for λ-terms [3] and, with extensions to the type structure, for sequential and concurrent imperative programs [8, 31, 32] .
To investigate the relationship with the type-based approach in [23] , we introduce tamp(A) (the lowest possible effect level of A) and ∼ =s (a secrecy-sensitive contextual congruence), both from [23] . 5 Given Pi Ci where Ci = yi : τi⊗ ↑ A -x ⊗?B -x (i = 1, 2), the rule requires that, in the antecedents, P
for any s such that s s , in order to conclude that
Definition 9.
(tamper level, [23] ) The tamper level of τ , denoted tamp(τ ), is defined as follows. We assume τ = τ 1 ..τ i ..τ n and τ i = τ i1 ..τ ij ..τ ini .
1. tamp(τ ) = if τ is not affecting.
tamp((
Then we set tamp(A) def = {tamp(τ ) | x : τ occurs in A for some x}.
Observe tamp(τ ) = whenever τ is not affecting. Proof. By induction on the derivation of typing judgements in the secure typing system of Appendix E. The only non-immediate case is (Bra ↓ ). Let the behavioural security of P i be witnessed by S i (i ∈ I). Define
To see that S is a secrecy witness it is clearly sufficient to show that R ∪ ≈ s is an s-bisimulation where R is given by:
. So l is s-∆ strongly invisible. This means that
} j∈I is ∆-branching closed and, by assumptions, P j ≈ s P k for all j, k ∈ I, so we have indeed found a matching set of transitions.
Conversely, if P
by the s-∆ strong invisibility of l. As P j ≈ s P i , we can find ∆-branching closed sets
As an illustration of how to deal with the remaining rules, we now consider (Par). Assume P i A i ∈ S i (i = 1, 2) and define
Induction on the derivation of that transition has essentially two cases. The first is this one.
By (IH), Q 1 ∈ S 1 and Q 1 ≈ s Q 1 whenever s s and l is receiving at s. Hence (ν x)(Q 1 |Q 2 ) ∈ S and, repeatedly using Proposition 9, (ν x)(Q 1 |Q 2 ) ≈ s (ν x)(Q 1 |Q 2 ) whenever l is receiving at s and s s .
The other case, communication between Q 1 and Q 2 , is dealt with just as straightforwardly.
Proposition 10 allows us to consistently integrate the secrecy typing of [20, 23] and the present behavioural theory, for the secrecy analysis in processes and, via embedding, in programs. For example, given a λ ()×+ -term M N , we can check the secrecy of [[M ] ] m by typing, [[N ] ] n by behavioural secrecy, and finally verify their combination using typing. Another consequence of Proposition 10 is a simple proof of the following noninterference result, first given in [23] . We first start from the following lemma.
Lemma 8. Assume that P 1,2 A and tamp(A) s then P
Proof. We define
Clearly R is semi-typed. To see that it is an s-bisimulation let (P B , Q C ) ∈ R, C . Clearly this transition is also ∆-branching closed. Easily, B C. But because the name we loose in the transition, x, is not in fn(C) and the new ones we import by l are fresh P B R Q C , as required. If x ∈ fn(C) we must distinguish two cases.
-If l is an output, then it is s-∆-invisible. The reason for this depends on whether l is linear or not. In the former case, by assumptions, sec(B(x)) s because tamp(B) s. In the latter case s-∆-invisibility is a consequence of ∆-invisibility which in turn follows from l being non-affecting. In either case then Q Cl −→ Q C and we can proceed as in the case above where x / ∈ fn(C). -If l is an input, we use input availability (Lemma 4 (3) to infer the existence of a transition Q C l −→ Q C ). In this case easily B C , i.e. P B R Q C , as required.
Corollary 3. (noninterference) Let P 1,2 A be typable by the secrecy typing rules in Appendix E and tamp(A) s. Then P 1 ∼ =s P 2 A.
Proof. By Lemma 8 and Propositions 10 and 9.
We conclude this section by an example of reasoning about the secure λ-term mentioned in the introduction. Remark 4. (extensions to other type structures) We have presented a theory of behavioural secrecy focussing on the pure linear π-calculus. The framework is systematically extendible to other type structures which integrate linearity with affinity (nontermination) [7] , statefulness (references) [23] , control [17] and nondeterminism [20] . In each case, the only necessary extensions are (1) the incorporation of a new s-affecting action into s-bisimilarity and its dual receiving action into behavioural secrecy, and (2) when affinity (nontermination) is in the type structure, we change Definition 1 as follows: B becomes () ↑A (↑ A indicates possibly diverging, or affine, output), and the condition "C[
* x|P for some P , and ⇑ x iff not ⇓ x ). Except for these two changes, Definitions 1-8 can be used without change. To elaborate further:
• To extend this calculus to the affine type structures of [7] , we first check Definition 1, redefined as above. Clearly, any unary affine output is affecting, hence both unary and branching affine outputs are categorised as affecting in the same way as linear branching output in Table 1 . They are however not enabling, hence affine inputs are not enabled, unlike linear inputs. At the level of secrecy, this means we abstract away, in ≈ s , affine outputs with high secrecy levels, just as linear selection; dually, affine inputs is taken care of in behavioural secrecy. We also note that mixing linearity and affinity in a single type structure is easily done consistently, see [23] .
• To extend the present theory to non-determinism [20] , we add reference agents [23] or, equivalently, recursion [20] and incorporate stateful replicated inputs/outputs which are given to (in the case of references) "write" actions. Using Definition 1 or its affine version mentioned above, we can show that stateful replicated outputs are affecting and enabled. The secrecy refinement works as in the previous example. This allows us to infer, via an embedding, that the following imperative program is behaviourally secure (assuming ⊥ s ):
The encoding of this program, given in [20, 23] , allows to neglect the lowlevel "reading" action at x and the high-level writing at z because they are categorised as (non-stateful) replicated output. On the other hand, the action at y which is stateful and hence affecting at ⊥, leads to the same effect in both branches so the two branches are s-bisimilar. This warrants us to conclude that the encoding is behaviourally secure. Equational and operational correspondence allows to lift this result to the source program, so it must be secure.
Mixing linearity with other type structures (cf. [23] ) can be done so that we can ensure the same liveness property for call sequences (Lemma 2 (3)) in each extension, which allows us to apply the same proof methods to obtain the corresponding results such as Theorem 1 and Proposition 9. Together with full abstraction, the framework offers a basis for uniform behavioural analysis of secrecy in programming languages.
We omit rules for unary prefixes since they are subsumed by those for branching/selection.
B Action Types
We first reiterate the definition of action types. An action type, denoted A, B, . . ., is a finite directed graph with nodes of the form x : τ , such that:
• no names occur twice; and • edges are of the form x : τ → y : τ such that either (1) md(τ ) =↓ and md(τ ) =↑ or (2) md(τ ) = ! and md(τ ) = ?.
We write x → y if x : τ → y : τ for some τ and τ , in a given action type. If x occurs in A and for no y we have y → x then we say x is active in A. |A| (resp. fn(A), sbj(A), md(A)) denotes the set of nodes (resp. names, active names, modes) in A. We often write x : τ ∈ A instead of x : τ ∈ |A|, and write A(x) for the channel type assigned to x in A. A\ x is the result of taking off nodes with names in x from A. A⊗B is the graph union of A and B, with the condition that fn(A) ∩ fn(B) = ∅. The symmetric partial operator on types is already given in Section 2. We then write A B iff:
• whenever x : τ ∈ A and x : τ ∈ B, τ τ is defined; and • whenever x 1 → x 2 , x 2 → x 3 , . . . , x n → x n+1 (alternately in A and B), we have
Then A B, defined iff A B, is the following action type.
• x : τ ∈ |A B| iff either (1) x ∈ (fn(A)\fn(B)) ∪ (fn(B)\fn(A)) and x : τ occurs in A or B; or (2) x : τ ∈ A and x : τ ∈ B and τ = τ τ .
A and B (n ≥ 2) and, moreover, for no w we have w → x and for no w we have y → w in A or B.
We can easily check that is a symmetric and associative partial operation on action types with unit ∅.
C Typing Rules
A y : τ indicates each y i : τ i occurs in A. x : τ → A adds new edges from x : τ to the non-suppressed nodes in A. A -x indicates x ∈ fn(A). We assume ↑ A in (In ↓ ) and (Bra ↓ ) is either a singleton or empty ("unique-answer-per-thread").
D Transition Rules
We assume all l.h.s. processes are well-typed. A allows l unless: (1) A(sbj(l)) = * or (2) l is output and md(A(sbj(l))) = !, cf. [7] . n(l) is the set of names in l.
xini( y).P
We omit rules for unary actions and symmetric case of |. The rules are well-typed in the sense that if P A1 1 is well-typed and P
is well-typed.
E Secrecy Typing
We first give the typing rules in which (1) annotated channel types are used, and (2) no secrecy is incorporated into the typing rules. Thus the set of typable terms are precisely the same as those given by Appendix C, and the secrecy properties (e.g. noninterference) are not ensured. The notations are as before.
In the linear type structure, the secrecy of processes is ensured simply by replacing the rule (Bra ↓ ) above by the following one. Other rules remain the same.
We call the resulting set of processes, securely typed processes.
F Proofs in Section 4
F.1 Proofs for Lemma 3
In the following, we often denote l ≡ α l if they originates from the same index and ≡ denotes the structure equivalence (hence P ≡ Q ⇒ P ≈ L Q).
(1) Standard.
(2) Let ∆ = fn(A). Assume R = {((P |R 1 ), (P |R 2 )) | P and R i as in Lemma 3 (2)}. We prove R is a bisimulation using Lemma 3 (1).
Obviously sbj(l) ∈ ∆, so l is invisible. Next, since fn(P ) ∩ { y} = ∅, P and R 1 only share replicated output names. Set
, we have (P | R 2 ) R (P | R 1 ), as desired. As such, we can easily check if R 1 l −→ R 1 , l is invisible, and moreover it satisfies the side condition.
The case P | R 1 τ −→ (ν x)(P | R 1 ) with P l −→ P and R 1 l −→ R 1 . Then by definition, md(l) = ! and md(l) = ?. Let us assume l = a( x). Then we can write down P ≡ (ν w)(!a( x).P 0 | Q) and R 1 ≡ a( x)R 01 . Hence P | R 1 τ −→≡ (ν w)(!a( x).P 0 | Q | (ν x)(P 0 | R 01 )). Note that (ν x)(P 0 | R 01 ) only share ?-names with !a( x).P 0 |Q. By appropriate renaming on R 2 , we have
Hence by applying (1), we conclude the proof. Case md(l) = !: Suppose P l −→ P . Then we can easily check (P, P ) is in the relation defined in (2), by assigning R 1 ≡ α 0. Hence done.
There are two interesting cases. Other cases are just similar with the case for τ . Let Γ = fn(P ) ∩ fn(P ).
Suppose P a( x ) −→ P {x i /x i } where two actions are occurred at the same indices, i.e. P gets different bound names x i and x i from the outside. Then we can write
Then we can apply Lemma 3 (2), defining P def = R, R 1 def = i Q i and R 2 def = i Q i {x i /x i }. Hence P ≈ L P {x i /x i }. Since a is a linear output name, a ∈ fn(P ), so a ∈ Γ. Thus a( x) is a Γ invisible. Hence by P ε =⇒ P , we have P {x i /x i }RP , as desired. −→ P }∪ ≈ L is a bisimulation. Just similar with the case of ↑ above by using confluence, except the following case, which corresponds to the former case of ↑ above. Suppose P a( x ) −→ P {x i /x i } where two actions a( x) and a( x ) are the same indices, i.e. P gets different bound names x i and x i from the outside. Then this time, we can write down P ≡ (ν w)( i Q i |R) and P {x i /x i } ≡ (ν w)( i Q i {x i /x i } | R) with R i ≡ x i ( w i ).Q i or x i in j ( w j ).Q j . This time we can apply Lemma 3 (3), hence we have P ≈ L P {x i /x i }. The rest is the same as the former case of ↑ above. (5) and (6), we always have P ≈ L P . Note, for each case, we can easily verify that ∆ ⊆ fn(P ) ∩ fn(P ) and ∆ = fn(P ) ∩ fn(Q), as similar with the proofs in Lemma 3 (5) and (6) . Hence by the transitivity, we have Q ≈ L P , as required. Hence by definition of the transition relation, there exists an injective renaming σ such that P l −→ P =⇒ ∆ P j σ with (a) dom(σ) ∩ ∆ = ∅, and (b) cod(σ) ∩ (fn(P ) ∪ fn(Q)) = ∅. We also note that {P =⇒ ∆ P j σ} is a ∆-b.c. and P k σ ≈ L Q for each k by Lemma 3 (4) . Note that ∆ = fn(Q) ∩ fn(P j σ). Hence with Q ε =⇒ Q, we have P RQ, as required. (6,7): Similarly with (2) using Lemma 2 (4) and Lemma 3 (4).
F.3 Proofs for Lemma 7
First we can easily check the side condition, "the linear output outside of ∆ is not suppressed by the linear input at ∆", is always maintained as proved in the end of the proof of Proposition 8. Hence we only have to check ∆-b.c. and bisimulation. We assume P , Q 1 and Q 2 in the following is the same as in (7).
Case A: Let {P l 1k =⇒ P k } k∈K . Then md(l 1k ) =↑. Let sbj(l k1 ) = e. Case 1: Suppose sbj(l 1k ) ∈ fn(Q 1 ). Then obviously P | Q 1 =⇒ ∆ P k | Q 1 , as desired. Case 2: Suppose sbj(l 1k ) ∈ fn(Q 1 ). Then we have either B 1 = e : τ ⊗ B or B 1 = c : τ → e : τ ⊗ B for some c ∈ ∆. For both cases (since c ∈ ∆ in the latter case), by Lemma 2 (3,4), we have a ∆-branching closed sequences {Q 1 =⇒ ∆ Q 1i } i∈I where (A) for all i ∈ I, Q 1i
by Lemma 4 (6), and (B) for all n ∈ I, there exists k ∈ K such that l n = l k1 because {P Hence by (a) and (c) above, together with Lemma 1 (1), {(P |Q 1 ) =⇒ ∆ (P k |Q 1i )} i∈I is ∆-b.c. Then by Lemma 4 (6), we have Q 1i ≈ L Q 1 as required.
Case B: Let {P l2 =⇒ P l 1k −→ P k } with md(l 2 ) = ? and md(l 1k ) =↑ with l 2 b l 1k . The case sbj(l 2 ) ∈ fn(Q 1 ) is the same as above. So suppose sbj(l 2 ) ∈ fn(Q 1 ). Then by (input availability), we always have Q 1 l2 −→ Q 1 with md(l 2 ) = !. By Lemma 2 (5), we know Q 1 ≈ L Q 1 . Note that {P | Q 1 τ −→ (ν w)(P | Q 1 )} is ∆-b.c. Set P = Q 1 and Q 1 = P . Then by applying the same reasoning as above starting from Q 1 | P , we can get a desirable ∆-b.c., again using Lemma 1 (1).
We can easily observe that Cases A and B can be extended to {P l1···l 1k =⇒ P k } if all subjects in call-sequences from Q 1 are not overlapped with fn(P ) by Lemma 1 (1).
Case C: Next suppose subjects in a ∆-branching closed sequences {Q 1 =⇒ ∆ Q 1i } i∈I in Case (A-2) overlapped with fn(P ). If replicated output names are overlapped, then we can use Lemma 2 (5) as we proved in Case B. Suppose a linear input name in {Q 1 =⇒ ∆ Q 1i } i∈I is overlapped with fn(P ). I.e. Q 1 li1···lin i =⇒ Q 1i with l i1 linear input with sbj(l i1 ) ∈ fn(P ). Then by Lemma 2 (3, extended liveness), we have P =⇒ ∆ P m li1 −→. Then we can repeat the same argument as Case A. Note by (extended liveness), this routine (call sequences from P | Q 1 ) is always finite, so we finish the proof.
